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INTRODUCTION
In 1949, the establishment of the Peo-
ple’s Republic of China (PRC†) resulted in
the cessation of mainland China’s diplo-
matic ties with Western countries. Only
afterU.S.PresidentRichardNixon’svisitto
China and the signing of the Shanghai
Communiqué in 1972 were Sino-American
diplomatic relations formally established.
Academic exchanges between the PRC and
the United States then began. Formed in
1966,theCommitteeonScholarlyCommu-
nication with the PRC (CSCPRC) had,
since 1973, facilitated many U.S. scholars’
visits to China by acting as liaison with its
Chinesecounterpart(mainlyChineseAcad-
emy of Science) and providing economic
support. Between 1973 and 1978, several
American delegations traveled to China on
scientificandacademicexchangesconcern-
ing matters such as acupuncture anesthesia,
herbal pharmacology, paleanthropology, in-
sect control, and plant studies. The Ameri-
can SchistosomiasisDelegation (ASD) was
among the exchange groups [1]. The
CSCPRC began discussing a study tour on
schistosomiasiswiththePRCScientificand
Technical Association in May 1973; a trip
took place fromApril 8 to May 2, 1975.
Unlike members of other scholarly
delegations, theASD members were dissat-
isfied with the tour because they were not
granted access to the places and people
they had wanted to visit and meet, so no
significant achievements resulted from
their trip. Their hosts, members of the Chi-
nese Medical Association, however, were
less concerned with engaging in meaning-
ful scientific exchanges. Instead of provid-
ing the necessary assistance to the ASD,
they frequently controlled the delegation’s
itinerary and withheld information from
them. The ASD issued a report in The
American Journal ofTropical Medicine and
Hygiene [2], in which it commented on the
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9041279 (CityU 142707)].manner in which the Chinese medical scien-
tists had hosted the visit.
Thispaperattemptstoplacetheproblems
encounteredbytheASDinChinainahistorical
context and explore why in 1975 the Chinese
Medical Association, as the official host, was
reluctant to show the delegation the actual ex-
tentof schistosomiasis infection inthePRC.1
BACKGROUND OF THE ASD’S VISIT
TO CHINA
The ASD consisted of 12 members,
with Ernest Bueding of Johns Hopkins Uni-
versity and Paul F. Basch of Stanford Uni-
versity, respectively, acting as chairman and
deputy chairman of the delegation. Among
the other members were six parasitologists
and medical experts, one anthropologist, one
historian, one chemist, and one representa-
tive from the U.S. Department of State.Ac-
cording to the members’ research output
prior to 1975, none had conducted studies of
schistosomiasis in China. It would, there-
fore, be interesting to know why they joined
the delegation and came to China to under-
stand the control of this epidemic.
Schistosomiasis japonica is a parasitic
and fatal disease in tropical and subtropical
areas where water snails, the intermediate
hosts of the parasite, live. The southern
provinces of China such as Anhui, Fujian,
Jiangsu, Jiangxi, and Zhejiang had been se-
riouslythreatenedbythisdisease.Thespread
of schistosomiasis, which adversely affected
agricultural production, prompted Chairman
MaoZedongtoinitiateamassanti-schistoso-
miasis campaignin 1955 under the slogan of
“Schistosomiasis has to be eliminated.” The
campaign, which integrated mass mobiliza-
tion, science, agricultural production, local
construction projects, and preventive works,
aimed at ultimately removing one of the ob-
stacles to the development of agriculture.2
On June 30, 1958, Mao read reports in
the newspaper People’s Daily that were re-
lated to eliminating schistosomiasis from
Yujiang county in Jiangxi Province. Mao
was very happy and could not sleep, instead
writing a poem entitled “Farewell to the
Plague Spirit” to commemorate the cam-
paign in Yujiang county. Since 1958, the
Chinese central government continuously
promoted the idea that schistosomiasis had
been controlled and the disease completely
eradicated in 167 prefectures and cities, ac-
counting for more than half of the total en-
demic areas. It is hardly believable that the
PRC could have eliminated the illness in all
the provinces between the 1950s and the
1970s. However, by the 1970s, it seemed the
epidemic had been brought under control in
some counties and provinces, ostensibly
through Mao’s political will3. The achieve-
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1Chinese Medical Association, established in 1915, is a non-profit academic organization formed by
medical institutions. It aims to improve professional skills among those who work in medical industry, to
promote the development of medical science and technology, and to serve as a liaison between the
government and medical workers. The association also is responsible for international exchange, pub-
lishing medical books and journals, and to provide training and examinations for specialized physicians.
2ForadescriptionofthehistoryoffightingschistosomiasisinChina,seeF.R.Sandbach,“Farewelltothegodof
plague—thecontrolofschistosomiasisinChina,”SocialScienceandMedicine.1977;11:27-33;WarrenKen-
neth,“Farewelltotheplaguespirit:ChairmanMao’scrusadeagainstschistosomiasis;”inJohnBowers,William
HessandNathanSivin(eds),ScienceandMedicineinTwentieth-centuryChina:ResearchandEducation.Ann
Arbor:CenterforChineseStudies,TheUniversityofMichigan,1988,pp.123-140;KaWaiFanandHonKeiLai,
“MaoZedong’sFightAgainstSchistosomiasis,”PerspectivesinBiologyandMedicine.2008;51(2):176-87.
3In 1953, Chairman Mao implemented the First Five-Year Plan (1953-1957) that aimed for a substan-
tial improvement in agricultural production as the fulfillment of the second stage (industrialization) of
socialism. In 1956, Mao realized the inevitable failure of the First Five-Year Plan that failed to meet
the expected target. After an investigation, Mao attributed the failure to the prevalence of schistosomi-
asis in the southern provinces. Therefore, by resolving to eliminate a disease that might impede the
development of agriculture, Mao Zedong launched the mass campaign against snail-borne schistoso-
miasis in 1956 as an economic and agrarian policy. The campaign integrated mass mobilization, local
construction projects, and prophylactic measures. The control of schistosomiasis, in other words, was
an important means in the promotion of socialism.ment made by the PRC in controlling schis-
tosomiasis startled the world, which since
then has remembered Mao as a fighter of
schistosomiasis [3].
Many scholars considered that the anti-
schistosomiasis campaign, which began in
the 1950s, had in many ways effectively
eradicated the disease. Brian Maegraith, pro-
fessor ofTropical Medicine at the University
of Liverpool, visited China in 1958 to study
schistosomiasis and subsequently recorded
his observations in his article “Schistosomi-
asis in China,” published in The Lancet.The
article stated that “The Chinese have set as
their target the practical control of schistoso-
miasis within twelve years from now. Their
cooperative enthusiasm, skill and dedication
to the task should enable them to achieve
this objective.” [4]Tien-Hsi Cheng from the
Department of Biology at Pennsylvania
State University wrote in his essay “Schisto-
somiasis in Mainland China: a review of re-
search and control programs since 1949,”
published in 1971, that although there was
considerable success in the prevention of
schistosomiasis in the 1950s, the outbreak
of the Cultural Revolution delayed the com-
plete eradication of the disease [5].
In 1972, Hua-ling Nieh Engle and Paul
Engle translated Mao’s poem “Farewell to
the Plague Spirit” into English and gave an
account of the schistosomiasis prevention
campaign carried out in the 1950s [6]. Fol-
lowing their field study in 1972, Dr H.F. Hsu
and Dr S.Y. Li Hsu co-authored and pub-
lished in 1974 an article titled “Schistosomi-
asis in the Shanghai Area,” in which they
mentioned that “this disease is now under
control, as exemplified by the disease-free
Hua Tsao commune, previously an impor-
tant endemic area of schistosomiasis.”4
Members of the ASD could have learned
about the efforts made by the PRC central
government and local communes in combat-
ing schistosomiasis through reading these
English language publications. It is not sur-
prising that China’s ability to accomplish
widespread control of schistosomiasis as
early as the 1950s, as suggested in the arti-
cles, had attracted the attention of the ASD
members, although they were not them-
selves schistosomiasis researchers or epi-
demiologists with a specialization in China.
FRUSTRATION TO THE ASD
The ASD arrived in Beijing in April
1975, with the Chinese MedicalAssociation
its host for the duration of the trip. Instead of
immediately visiting the infected regions,
which were concentrated in southern China,
the members stayed in Beijing after their ar-
rival. George H.W. Bush, then the U.S. am-
bassador in China, recorded in his memoir
that the Chinese officials took the delegation
members to the Great Wall and the Forbid-
den City for sightseeing and to famous
restaurants to taste Chinese food. In the end,
the members of the ASD could not achieve
the objectives of their trip. Bush wrote,
“Only after numerous requests — and fi-
nally complaints — did the Chinese bureau-
cracy break down and permit theAmericans
to examine their native snails.” [7] It was ob-
vious that the Chinese ministers never in-
tended to allow the ASD members to
observe the infected areas. The ASD report
stated that out of the 25 days of the trip,
fewer than eight days were spent studying
the prevention and treatment of schistosomi-
asis, and the remaining time was spent tour-
ing historical sites, factories, and facilities
for youngsters and workers. After repeated
demands, theASD eventually was permitted
to visit some limited locations along the
Yangtze River, namely Shanghai and its
nearby areas. Considering that members of
the Han Dynasty Studies Delegation, who
arrived at China in 1981, were able to go to
places as far as Dunhuang in Gansu
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4The field trip of Drs. H.F. Hsu and S.Y. Li Hsu was also arranged by the Chinese Medical Associa-
tion. The information reported by them about the prevention and treatment of schistosomiasis was all
positive, and it was suspected that this was the outcome of careful planning by their Chinese counter-
parts. H.F. Hsu and S.Y. Li Hsu, “Schistosomiasis in the Shanghai Area,” in Joseph Quinn (ed), China
Medicine As We Saw It. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govt. Printing Office; 1974. pp. 345-66.Province, the province furthest to the west
[8], it appears difficult to explain why the
mobility of the ASD was so severely re-
stricted.
According to the ASD report, the infor-
mationaboutschistosomiasisthatthedelega-
tion had wanted to obtain was the following:
1. the extent of schistosomiasis infec-
tion in China after the Cultural Revolution,
especially the prevalence rates for different
endemic areas;
2. data, obtained through direct inter-
views with staff at institutions that had led
the prevention campaign for the past 20
years;
3. the expenditure by the central gov-
ernment on disease control and the localities
of disease control; and
4. the lessons learned by China from the
prevention campaign that would be useful
for other developing countries affected by
the same disease.
The Chinese interference in the delega-
tion’s trip, which can be categorized into the
following three main aspects, caused the
ASD’s failure to obtain any of the above in-
formation:
1. the delegation’s itinerary was under
strict scrutiny and control;
2. the information about schistosomia-
sis supplied by the Chinese MedicalAssoci-
ation was sketchy and vague, most of it
dating back to the 1950s; and
3. the interviewees had been carefully
selected and each gave standardized an-
swers.
The scope of the interference suggests
that the unwillingness of the Chinese to dis-
close information was not limited to a few
officials. Instead, it was part of a central plan
to restrict the activities of the delegation and
provide only information censored by the
Chinese Medical Association5. Needless to
say, such official information did not really
assist the ASD in understanding the trans-
mission, prevention, and treatment of the
disease in 1970s China. For example, David
Lampton pointed out that the number of
beds the ASD members noted on their visit
to a county hospital was not representative
of the situation prevailing in other regions
of China [9].
The discontent of the ASD with the
overlyofficialandrigidlystructureditinerary
probably came as a surprise to the host, the
Chinese MedicalAssociation, which had the
experience of organizing a similar visit in
1972 for Dr H.F. Hsu and Dr S.Y. Li Hsu.
WhentheseexpertswenttoHuaTsaocounty
(an endemic area in the western suburb of
Shanghai) to study schistosomiasis, they
made no complaint about their itinerary in
their report. It was obvious that the places
and people the two scholars visited and met
were carefully planned and controlled by the
Chinese Medical Association to ensure that
all information they received and the obser-
vations they made suggested that the anti-
schistosomiasis campaign had been a
success. Moreover, other delegations spon-
soredbytheCSCPRCtoacertainextentalso
faced similar restrictions and they did not
seem to have objected to their host’s behav-
ior. Members of the Herbal Pharmacology
Study Group, for whom sightseeing tours
also had been arranged and who had been
similarly prohibited from talking to the Chi-
nese scientists in private during their visit in
1974, did not express any dissatisfaction
with the limitations they faced in conducting
their observations in their report [10]. This
was because, unlike theASD members, they
were able to see what they had come to see.
Although representatives of the Chinese
MedicalAssociationrepeatedlyinformedthe
delegation that schistosomiasis was com-
pletelyeliminatedinmanyendemicareasand
theASD concluded in its report that the Chi-
nese interventions prevented it from objec-
tively assessing the preventive measures
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5In fact, each province, county, or city that had set up its schistosomiasis prevention station had main-
tained data of the past years concerning anti-schistosomiasis, such as the number of people infected,
the number of patients with acute infection, the expenditure on schistosomiasis prevention, and the
areas subject to snail eradication. See Ka Wai Fan, “Documentary Records of the Prevention of
Schistosomiasis in China,” Journal of East Asian Libraries. 2007;135:23-6.adopted in China and their effectiveness, the
ASD succeeded in making several important
observationsonthebasisofthefirst-handin-
formation collected during its short trip,
which contributed to the construction of the
history of schistosomiasis prevention in
China. TheASD revealed that the schistoso-
miasis prevention units formed at the local
level were unconnected to each other, and
there was no channel for these units to share
their research findings. Further, regarding
medicalresearch,theyfoundtheChinesehad
emphasizedtheirdiagnosesandthescreening
of traditional Chinese drugs for anti-schisto-
somal activity, but no basic work on the im-
munology of schistosomiasis was being
performed.Asimilaremphasisalsowasnoted
in their treatment of the host snails, as the
Chinesewereonlyconcernedwithwipingthe
snails out completely and their disinterest in
studying the hosts of the disease was evident
in the absence of the requisite equipment in
theirlaboratories.TheASDreportalsofound
a lack of understanding of the quantitative
work that had been done and of retrospective
epidemiological investigations. Notwith-
standingthelimitedextentofobservationsal-
lowed, the ASD was sufficiently astute to
note that “it is clear that even in some sites
seenbyourdelegation,schistosomiasisisnot
yet a thing of the past.” Had the delegation
traveled to the regions where the disease was
most prevalent, such as Jiangxi Province or
HunanProvince,itslikelyfindingswouldun-
doubtedly have been alarming and unwel-
comebytheChinesecentralgovernmentand
the Chinese MedicalAssociation. Why were
the Chinese so desperate to ensure that the
ASD would not discover that the official
claim that schistosomiasis had been com-
pletelyeradicatedinmostofChinawasfalse?
The answer to this question may be found in
thetightlywovenrelationshipbetweenschis-
tosomiasisandcommunistpoliticsatthetime
of the Cultural Revolution.
SCHISTOSOMIASIS AND
THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION
The concluding comments of the ASD
report state that “in some recent publications
and broadcasts, Lin Piao [Lin Biao] is vigor-
ously attacked because of his ‘counterrevo-
lutionary’ statements that ‘schistosomiasis
cannot be eradicated.’ These exhortations
would hardly be needed if eradication had
already been achieved.” In its report, the
ASD interpreted the publications and broad-
casts to mean that Lin Biao exposed the truth
that schistosomiasis had, in fact, not yet
been eliminated, and for this, he was being
persecuted. Had the ASD considered such
reports in the political context and deci-
phered their true meaning, it would have
been able to deduce the reason for its failure
to successfully carry out its mission.
Lin Biao, a political rival of Mao Ze-
dong, died with his family in a plane crash
when they attempted to escape from China
on September 13, 1971. In 1974, during the
Cultural Revolution, Mao’s wife Jiang Qing
started the “Criticize Lin Biao, Criticize
Confucius” movement, which reached its
climax by 1975, the year theASD arrived in
China. Although Lin Biao was not actually
closely associated with the anti-schistosomi-
asis campaign, he was the target of the pop-
ular slogan “Destroy Lin Biao and
Confucius, Eradicate snails completely with
conviction,” since schistosomiasis preven-
tion and politics had long been inseparable
issues in China.
Contrary to the ASD report, the person
who had said that schistosomiasis could not
be eliminated was Wei Wenbo, deputy
leader of the nine-manAnti-Schistosomiasis
Committee set up in 1955 under the auspices
of the Central Committee of the Communist
Party. During the Cultural Revolution, Wei
Wenbo was labeled a counter-revolutionary.
In 1968, Liu Shaoqi, the then president of
the PRC, was accused by his political ene-
mies of being a “capitalist roader” and trai-
tor to the Communist Party and was
subjected to vigorous attacks for more than
a year. Beginning in 1970, the movement
against Liu Shaoqi, who had died by then,
was revived.Two newspaper editorials were
published in Wenhui Bao and Jiefang Ribao
on March 10, 1970, criticizing Liu Shaoqi
for having turned the control of schistoso-
miasis, which was a matter of public health,
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Wenbo was denounced as pro-Liu Shaoqi,
and the statements made by Liu and Wei
concerning eradication of schistosomiasis
became the subject of severe criticism.
Mao launched the anti-schistosomiasis
campaign in 1955. However, Liu Shaoqi
thought the campaign squandered national
wealth and labor without generating actual
benefits. Wei Wenbo commented that it was
impossible to eradicate all the host snails,
since there was no way to completely re-
move the soil in which the snails lived and
eradication of the disease could not be
achieved within a generation. More impor-
tantly, the public health movements that
commenced in the 1950s often stressed the
importance of mass participation, and this
characteristic was also dominant in the anti-
schistosomiasis campaign. It was vital to the
success of the campaign that the masses
were mobilized to destroy the innumerable
host snails.WeiWenbo’s alternative opinion
that experts should be relied on in control-
ling the epidemic was interpreted as being
against the Cultural Revolution’s motto of
negating the supremacy of professionals and
technology. Because their views were con-
trary to Mao Zedong’s ideology, both Liu
Shaoqi and Wei Wenbo were labeled
counter-revolutionaries during the anti-Liu
Shaoqi andWeiWenbo movement started in
1970, and eliminating schistosomiasis was
promoted as a symbol of the overthrow of
Liu and Wei. Many articles published at the
time in the daily newspaper Renmin Ribao
opined that Liu Shaoqi disrupted the schisto-
somiasis prevention work.The same allega-
tion was leveled in 1975 at Lin Biao, even
though he was unconnected with the anti-
schistosomiasis campaign. Clearly, the anti-
schistosomiasis movement was manipulated
as a weapon to achieve political ends6.
At the time of theASD visit to China in
1975, the control of schistosomiasis contin-
ued to be a sensitive political subject. Since
Chinese officials in the 1960s already de-
clared schistosomiasis eliminated in most of
the affected regions despite the fact that it
was still prevalent in many areas, staff of the
Chinese Ministry of Health provided the
ASD with standardized answers and 20-
year-old data to prove that the disease had
been eradicated and reinforce that impres-
sion to avoid being labeled counter-revolu-
tionary and associated with members of the
Liu-Lin camp.
THE SECOND VISIT TO CHINA
In 1984, Professor Paul F. Basch, the
deputy chairman of theASD, was sponsored
by the CSCPRC to revisit China and study
the prevalence of schistosomiasis there. In
1986, Basch published an article, “Schisto-
somiasis in China: An Update,” in The
American Journal of Chinese Medicine, dis-
cussing his observations from the trip [11].
According to Basch’s report, the itiner-
ary of this second visit was completely dif-
ferent. Basch was permitted to visit five
cities, namely, Shanghai, Wuhan (Hubei
Province), Hangzhou (Zhejiang Province),
Xiamen (Fujian Province), and Hailar (Inner
MongoliaAutonomous Region). In addition,
he made a trip to a relatively remote rural
area in Hubei Province. Basch was provided
relevant information about schistosomiasis
by many people on numerous occasions.
Materially, Basch’s report also differed con-
siderably from the ASD report. Besides
pointing out the achievements made in con-
trolling schistosomiasis, Basch also reported
on its epidemiology in the provinces with
the most infections and the operation of the
disease control station in Yangxin county in
Hubei Province, one of the disease epidemic
centers, where he stayed for 24 hours to con-
duct observations.These were tasks that had
been impossible to accomplish on his first
visit as a member of theASD delegation.
The absence of the sorts of restrictions
imposed on the ASD mainly can be attrib-
uted to the fact that in 1984 Mao Zedong
was already dead and the Gang of Four re-
sponsible for the atrocities committed during
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6For example, Dong Cheng, “Weisheng Geming de Xianhua Chuchu Hong,” (Blossom of the Flowers
of the Hygiene Revolution),” Renmin Ribao, 25 January 1975, p.3.the Cultural Revolution had been arrested
and punished, resulting in schistosomiasis
and the question of its complete eradication
no longer perceived as politically taboo sub-
jects with a counter-revolutionary connota-
tion.
CONCLUSION
Commencing in the 1950s, when Mao
gave the order that “schistosomiasis has to
be eliminated,” the anti-schistosomiasis
campaign had mobilized a huge number of
people (especially for the killing of snails)
and triggered complementary agricultural
production and water conservation projects.
Atask that in the beginning was about public
hygiene and disease prevention became a
political tool during the Cultural Revolution
to destroy Liu Shaoqi, Lin Biao, and Wei
Wenbo.The Chinese Ministry of Health and
the Chinese Medical Association were ex-
tremely sensitive to theASD’s visit, made at
a time of a large-scale internal power strug-
gle.Although the information about the dis-
ease (official or otherwise) that theASD had
hoped to obtain was available, nobody in
China was willing to take the politicalrisk of
disclosing it.
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